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1. Introduction 
 
This paper highlights the soft budget problem in the context of intergovernmental 
grants, which ex post refers to the circumstance of “local government turning to the 
central government for fiscal relief” (Oates (2005)) and ex ante manipulating “its access 
to funds in undesirable ways” (Rodden et al. (2003)). The paper then addresses ex post 
bailouts induced by ex ante moral hazard or adverse incentive effects. 
 
The modeling is analogous to the Samaritan’s dilemma in which altruistic individuals 
cannot commit not to assist the poor, whereas the latter ex ante anticipates ex post the 
motive of the former (Coate (1995)). If important local public services such as education 
and health are underprovided in a fiscally distressed region, this may be regarded as 
inequitable and thus unacceptable, leading to mounting pressure on the central 
government to assist such a region. The benevolence of the bailing out agent, however, 
is not necessary for this problem to occur. Goodspeed (2002) models the political 
economy of the soft budget in a two period setting with the central government 
providing interregional transfers for tactical purposes and local governments ex ante 
issuing bonds in a strategic manner.  
 
The decentralized leadership literature considers the related issues, whereas 
addressing ex ante horizontal and reciprocal externalities, with the central government 
acting as a Stackelberg follower and local government as a leader (Caplan et al. (2000)). 
The present paper follows the literature and develops a simple dynamic model. With the 
two period setting、it contains regional productivity enhancing investment in the first 
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 period as well as local public services in both periods. The local spending is financed by 
local taxes as well as local borrowing in the first period and intergovernmental transfers 
in the second period. The transfers are ex post optimized. We incorporate the ex ante 
central regulations on local borrowing. It is established that while the regional public 
investment turns to be efficient, ex ante the local governments are motivated to 
over-provide local public services in the anticipation that the burden is ultimately born 
nationwide. The upshot is that the ex ante central regulation on issuing local bonds is of 
no use to prevent such perverse incentives. In the extreme, the overspending in the 
sub-game perfect equilibrium is unchanged even if the balanced budget is imposed on 
the local governments ex ante prohibiting the borrowing. This occurs because the local 
governments can maneuver the residents’ saving by the use of the ex ante local taxation, 
which lowers the second period disposal income of the residents. This in turn influences 
the ex post transfers. Interestingly, in the present model, the ex ante overspending does 
not necessarily imply over-borrowing as opposed to conventional models of the soft 
budget, but over-taxation.   
 
The model is extended to the case of ex post residential mobility. It is then shown that 
the ex post transfers serve for different purpose than the basic model without mobility. 
The transfers are ex post designed to enhance efficiency of inter-regional allocation of 
population as is familiar in the fiscal federalism literature. The local government cannot 
attract ex post transfers by manipulating the residents’ saving. This prevents the 
incentive of overspending in the first period, but discourage the productivity enhancing 
investment. The central regulation becomes effective to prevent otherwise over 
borrowing incentive of the local governments. The presence of the ex post mobility thus 
gives different policy implications.  
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 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2  outlines the two period model. 
In Section 3, we consider the first best outcome of the model. Section 4 analyzes the ex 
post behavior of the central and local governments. In Section 5, we examine the ex ante 
behavior and derive the subgame perfect equilibrium. In Section 6, we consider the case 
of ex post free mobility across regions. Section 7 concludes this paper.  . 
 
2. Basic Setting 
 
The economy lasts two periods denoted by t=1,2 and contains J regions. Each region 
consists of a representative resident. We denote the population size in region i  by in , 
with the total population given by Nn
i i
=∑ . There are the central and local 
governments.  
 
At t=1, local government in region i spends giI  public investment that enhances 
regional production ),( i
g
ii nIF  in the second period. Local public services are provided 
by the local government as well. Write the first and the second period provisions of the 
public services by ig and iG  respectively. We assume that both the public services and 
),( i
g
ii nIF accrue to regional residents. The latter implies that the output is equally 
shared among the residents. Let ii
g
iii nnIFy /),(=  be residen’s income in region i. 
There are no inter-regional spillovers associated with the public services and 
investments. In the second period, the central government is in charge of 
intergovernmental transfers, iσ ( Ji ......1= ).  
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 Resident’s budget and utility 
 
Consider the representative resident in region i. Denote by iz his endowment in the 
first period. The regional production or ii
g
iii nnIFy /),(≡ realizes at t=2. His budget 
constraints at t=1 and 2 then are respectively expressed as:  
11
iiii tszc −−= , 22 iiii tsyc −+= .    (1) 
t
ic  (t=1,2) and is are private consumption and saving. 
t
it  is local tax level.  In (1), 
interest rate of saving is assumed to be zero for the sake of simplicity.  
 
The resident’s utility is given by: 
),(),(),(),(),,,( 212121 iiiiiiiiiiiiii GtyvgtzuGcvgcuGcgcU −+−=+= .   (2) 
The functions (.)u  and (.)v are monotonically increasing and strictly concave. We also 
let 0≥cgu . The present model abstracts preference heterogeneity of residents in one 
region.  Note that we instead account for inter-regional disparity in in  and iz . Also 
the production technology in the second period, ),( i
g
ii nIF , may be different among 
regions.  
 
Government’s budget constraint and intergovernmental transfer 
 
In t=1, the local public spending is financed by local tax and borrowing. Its first period 
budget constraint of the local government is given by:  
i
g
iiii nIgbt /
1 +=+ ,      (3) 
5
 where iii nBb /≡  represents per capita local borrowing. The budget constraint in 
period 2 is  
iiiii Gbnt =−+ /2 σ ,             (4) 
where the interest rate for the borrowing is set to zero. Recall that iσ  denotes the 
subsidy from the central government to the region. 
 
In the model, iσ  can be of either sign subject to the central budget constraint at t=2 
0
1
=∑
=
J
i
iσ                                (5) 
A negative transfer implies that the central government taxes the local government. We 
omit the central tax on the residents for simplicity. Rather the critical presumption here 
is that the central government possesses full discretion over iσ  at t=2 so as to pursue 
its ex post objective. 
 
The objectives of central and local governments 
 
The central government decides the transfer level so as to maximize the utilitarian 
objective ∑
i
iiiii GcgcUn ),,,(
21 . In this regard, it is assumed to be benevolent. The 
present model can be easily extended to contain a political motive with the central 
government aiming to maximize expected votes in election as is in Goodspeed (2002). It 
would however add only minor complications. Instead we focus on the commitment 
problem that occurs without political considerations. 
 
Turn to the local government. It decides the level of public services so as to maximize 
6
 the utility of its own region, ),,,( 21 iiii GcgcU . Substituting the local budgets (3) and (4), 
it becomes:  
)/,()/,( 22 iiiiiiiii
g
iiiii bnttsyvbnItstzuU −+−+++−−−= σ , (6) 
 
Timeline 
 
Timing is critical in our model. The sequence of decision makings is summarized as 
follows: 
  
First period (ex 
ante)  
 
- Local governments choose ig , 1it and 
g
iI  
- The residents select is  and consumes  
Second period (ex 
post) - ii
g
iii nnIFy /),(=  realizes  
- The central government determines iσ  
- The local governments choose iG
iG
and 2it  
 
 
The local borrowing at t=1 may be centrally regulated. In the second period, the central 
government acts, taking the ex ante decisions by local government as given. It then 
maximizes the social welfare from the ex post stand point, which gives rise to the 
commitment problem as we see below. Note, however that the central ex post 
optimization accounts for the local response of ig and it . In the first period, the local 
government takes into account how its ex ante choices affect the ex post central 
government policy, namely the ex post design of the interregional transfers as well as 
the private saving decisions. In this regard, it is the Stackelberg leader, but behaves in a 
Nash manner toward other local governments in the same stage. The residents in 
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 choosing is  on the other hand act competitively given the policy instruments.  
 
3. First Best Optimal Allocation 
 
Before illustrating the subgame perfect equilibrium, as a reference, let us consider the 
first best allocation that is determined by maximizing social welfare W  subject to the 
resource constraint: 
 
∑=
i
iiiiiIGgcc
GgccUnWMAX
g
iiiii
),,,( 21
,,,, 21
, 
subject to ∑∑∑∑∑∑∑
=======
+=++++
J
i
ii
J
i
i
g
ii
J
i
ii
J
i
ii
J
i
g
i
J
i
ii
J
i
ii znnIFGncnIgncn
1111
2
111
1 ),( . 
 
Due to strictly concavity of the sub-utility function, (.)1u  and (.)2u , the following 
proposition is immediate :  
 
Proposition 1 
The first best allocation is characterized by: 
****22****11 ,,, GGccggcc iiii ====  for all i  and **gigi II = with  
Gcgc vvuu ===  and  
1=∂
∂
ig
i
F
I
.                                   (7) 
Equation (7) will be compared with the subgame perfect equilibrium conditions derived 
in the subsequent sections. 
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 It is straightforward to see that the first best allocation would be achievable if the 
central government could commit to ex ante optimal transfer scheme such as: 
ii
g
iii
g
ii nnIFznIGgccn /),(//
**********2**1** −−++++=σ .          (8) 
 
4. Ex Post Behavior of the Central and Local Governments 
 
Local Government Ex post Behavior 
 
We proceed backwards, starting from the second period local optimization. Given that 
iy  and ib  have realized and iσ  is transferred, the local government decides 2it  (and 
thus iG  through (4)) to maximize the second period regional utility: 
)/,*( 22
2 iiiiiiit
bnttsyvMAX
i
−+−+ σ . 
The first order condition is given by: 
),(),( 22 iiGiic GcvGcv =      (9) 
 
Central Government Ex post Behavior 
 
At the previous stage, the central government chooses iσ  to maximize ex post social 
welfare subject to the budget constraint (5): 
{ }∑
=
−+−+
I
i
iiiiiiii bnttsyvnMAX
ii 1
22
,
)/,*( σστ  subject to 01 =∑=
J
i
iσ . 
given the ex ante regional decisions, but accounting for (9). The ex post optimization 
gives the first order condition as:  
9
 ),(),( 22 jjGiiG GcvGcv = .     (10) 
 (10) along with (9) implies 22 cci =  and GGi =  for all i . The ex post transfers fully 
equalize both the private consumption and the local public service at t=2.  
  
Ex Post Resource Constraint 
 
Combining the second period central and local budgets, we have ex post resource 
constraint: 
)*),((
1
2
iiii
J
i
i
g
ii bnsnnIFcNGN −+=+ ∑
=
.                   (11) 
2c  and G  are determined by solving (9) and (11), and can be written as )(2 Zc  and 
)(ZG , where 
)),((1))),((1
1
*
1
ii
J
i
i
g
iiiiii
J
i
i
g
ii QnnIFN
bnsnnIF
N
Z +=−+≡ ∑∑
==
        (12)  
In (12), we define regional net saving per capita iii bsQ −≡ *  for latter use. It is 
immediate to see that: 
dZ
Gd
dZ
cd +=
2
1 .            (13) 
with   
cccGGG
cGcc
vvv
vv
dZ
Gd
+−
−=
2
,  
cccGGG
cGGG
vvv
vv
dZ
Gd
dZ
cd
+−
−=−=
2
1
2
.     (14) 
 
Ex Post Transfers 
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 At this point, let us illustrate the features of the ex post optimal transfer function. 
Given that 
c
 22 cci =  and GGi =  for all i , combining the local budget and the 
resident’s budget constraints, we have: 
ii
i
i QyGcn −−+= 2
σ                 (15) 
Taking into account  (13), we can establish that ex post per capita transfers to 
region i  are decreasing in own net saving and increasing when other regions save 
more (so borrow less). 
ig∂
∂
01<−=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
N
n
nQ
i
i
i
i
σ
                                 (16.1) 
0>=⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
∂
∂
N
n
nQ
i
i
i
j
σ
  with j≠i                          (16.2) 
These results should be intuitive.  
 
5. Ex Ante Behavior of the Local Government 
 
 
Resident’s saving optimization 
 
In the first period, the representative resident decides the level of saving so as to 
maximize his utility: 
),(),( 21 iiiiiiiis GtsyvgstzuMAXi
−++−−  
Note that the resident takes as given the local policy instruments. The first order 
condition is then given by: 
),*()*,( 21 iiiiciiiic Gtsyvgstzu −+=−−        
11
 Once we incorporate the ex post optimization, this condition can be written as  
))(),(()/*,( 211 ZGZcvnIbtstzu ci
g
iiiiiic =−+−−           (17)  
where Z  is as defined by (12).  The saving has the following feature:  
1** 1 =∂
∂−∂
∂
i
i
i
i
t
s
b
s                                    (18) 
For the proof, see Appendix 1, in which other characteristics of the saving function is 
described. Equation (18) will be used to illustrate the ex ante regional optimization.  
 
Local Government’s optimization 
 
Accounting for the ex post central policy, which is summarized by )(2 Zc  and )(ZG , 
the local governments choose ),( 1 gii It  to maximize the local utility in region i , that is: 
))(),(()/,( 21*1
,1
ZGZcvnIbtstzuVMAX i
g
iiiiiii
It gii
+−+−−=  
where ))),((1 *
1
jjjj
J
j
j
g
jj bnsnnIFN
Z −+≡ ∑
=
 
The first order conditions with respect to giI  and 
1
it , become: 
g
i
i
i
i
c
i
c
i
gc
g
ii
i
g
i
i
i dI
dsnu
N
nvuvIF
N
n
dI
dVn
*
)()('0 −+−==                  (19) 
1
*
1 )(0
i
ii
c
i
c
i
c
i
g
i
i
dt
dsu
N
nvuu
dt
dV −+−==
                              (20) 
The last terms in (19) and (20) represent the policy induced change in the resident’s 
saving. Note that the local government acting as a Stackelberg leader toward the ex 
post central policy assess the value of the saving differently from the resident. The 
saving aims to equate the marginal utilities of the private consumption between the two 
12
 periods as (15) (given that interest rate is zero). The local government however 
incorporates ex post equalization through the transfers. This lowers share of the saving 
accruing to the region to Nni / , which leads to   
       
01 <⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ −=− ciicic vN
nu
N
nv
                             (21) 
The negative sign of (21) implies that each local government prefers to discourage 
own resident’s saving in the first period.  
Consider the local borrowing. The present model allows for the case that the central 
government regulates it. However, the following lemma established that such 
regulation does not constrain the ex ante local government’s optimization since ib is  
simply redundant.   
 
Lemma 1 
ib and it  are ex ante perfectly substitute policy instruments for the local government 
in the sense that:  
i
i
i
i
db
dV
dt
dV =1  
Proof : Using Equation (18) and (20), we have  
i
i
i
g
iiiii
c
i
cc
ii
g
i
g
iiiii
c
i
c
i
c
i
g
i
i
db
dV
db
Ibtdsu
N
nvv
N
nu
db
Ibtdsu
N
nvuu
dt
dV
=−+−=
−−+−=
)),,(*)((
)1),,(*)((
1
1
1
                       
 
Lemma 1 implies that the local borrowing is at the optimal level from the regional 
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 standpoint when the local tax is optimized. In this regard the local government can 
undo the central regulation on ib  by manipulating it . Indeed, reducing the local bond 
by one dollar induces one dollar increase in local tax that in turn decrease the resident’s 
saving by the same amount. By doing so, the net regional contribution to the second 
period resource iii bsQ −≡ * , remains the same. The following Proposition establishes 
these arguments.  
 
Proposition 2 
In the subgame perfect equilibrium, we have:  
(1) The change of central regulation is perfectly absorbed by the change of the local 
tax in the period 1, such that 1
1
−=
i
i
db
dt . 
(2) Through the change of the local tax, the change of central regulation is perfectly 
absorbed by the change of private saving in the period 1, such that 1* =
i
i
db
ds .  
(3) igˆ  and 
1ˆic  are independent from the regulation level, 
c
ib . 
(4) The investment level becomes efficient such that **ˆ gg II =  for all i  
 
Proof: See Appendix 2 
 
The second statement in the Proposition implies the Ricardian equivalency with the 
private saving being adjusted to change in local borrowing. As in the third statement, 
therefore, the local borrowing exerts no impact on the first period regional resource 
allocation in the equilibrium. The investment level is at the first best. The cost of 
financing the investment either through local bond or local tax, the latter of which cuts 
14
 the savings, is nationwide shared in the second period, whereas its return is also pooled. 
That is, regional share of both the cost and the return on gI is set equal to Nni / . Thus, 
the incentive of overinvestment due to the ex post cost sharing is fully offset by the 
disincentive arising from the ex post income sharing in the present contest.  
 
Social welfare: 
 
Now we assess the social welfare in the equilibrium, which becomes  
     { }∑
=
+−+−=
I
i
ii
g
iii ZGZcvgQIgzunSW
1
2 )ˆ(),ˆ(()ˆ),ˆˆˆ(    
Differentiating the welfare with respect to ig  and iii bsQ −≡ *  and evaluating the 
derivatives in the equilibrium yields the following:  
0)(
ˆ
<−= icigi
i
uun
gd
dSW 2                          (21.1)  
0)(ˆ 1
=−=⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛+−= ∑
=
i
ccic
i
J
i
i
i
ci
i
uvnv
N
nnun
Qd
dSW        (21.2)  
From these, the following proposition can be established.  
 
Proposition 3 
 
In the equilibrium,  
                                                  
2 From Equation (21) and Appendix 1, we have  
 
0)(1)1(
*
)1( 1 ≤−
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−
−=−=− icgicc
cii
cc
i
c
i
ii
c
i
c
i
g uu
dZ
dv
N
nuN
nv
dt
ds
N
nvuu  since 0≥icgu  
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  (a) igˆ  (or the tax in the first period 
**1 ˆˆ giiii Ibgt −+= ) is excessive irrespective of the 
size of local borrowing.  
(b) The level of the net saving becomes social optimum on margin. 
 
Note that even when 0=ib , that is, the ex ante local budget is set hard, the first 
result of the above proposition applies. The central regulation cannot prevent the local 
government from overspending ex ante therefore.  
The intuition can be interpreted as follows. In anticipation of the ex post equalization, 
the local government has the motive to shift the burden of the first period public service 
to other residents. The local government ex ante succeeds in doing so by raising the 
local tax and lowering the saving, which ex post raises transfer from the central 
government. The ex post transfer compensates one dollar reduction in the per capita 
saving by Nni /1− , so the resident bears only  Nni /  dollars.  
To see it differently, combine the residents’ life time budget with the local government 
one yielding the inter-temporal regional resource constraint as:  
          iiiiiii yznIGgcc σ++=++++ /21                 (22) 
In the present context, raising ig  financed by higher local tax at t=1 leads to 
increasing iσ  at t=2. In this regard, it is regional resource that is soften ex post.   
Turn to net regional saving. Although it has first order welfare effect as (21.2), the ex 
ante overspending on ig  leaves less resources for the private consumption and the 
second period public service. Thus they are under-provided than the social optimum. 
Equation (22) just states that the remaining resource is optimally split between the two 
periods. This will be confirmed in the example of the logarithm utility function that 
16
 compares the equilibrium with the first best outcome, considering the individual values 
of iQ .  
 
To summarize, the ex post equalization that more benefits regions with less regional net 
saving leads to ex ante perverse behavior among the local governments. This cannot be 
resolved by the central control on the local bonds that aims to harden the ex ante local 
budgets. In the present context, it is the resident’s saving instead of local borrowing that 
the local governments utilize to manipulate ex post transfers in their favor.  
 
Log Example 
 
In Proposition 3, social welfare implication of the net regional saving is assessed on 
margin. Instead, we can compare the equilibrium values of iQ with the first best 
outcome. Consider logarithm utility function: 
  
     )log()log()log()log(),,,( 2121 iiiiiiii GcgcGgccU +++=        (23)     
 
Appendix 3 establishes the following corollary.  
  
[Corollary to Proposition 2]  
Comparing the first-best level of iQ , we have the following result: 
**ˆ QQi >
<
  if and only if  
J
J
J
n
N
i
+
+><
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎥⎥
⎦
⎤
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎢⎢
⎣
⎡
−+
−
+
5
2
12
1
2
1
3
1
2
1
 
where iiiiii gczbsQ ˆˆˆ
1* −−=−=  and ****** iii gczQ −−= . 
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The inequality in the corollary holds with equality if J=1 and thus Nni = . 
Otherwise, given J(>1), **ˆ QQi <  is likely for a region with small in  since the left 
hand side of the condition is increasing in in  
 
6. Extension: Free mobility and the role of ex post transfer 
 
As an extension, the present section considers the situation that the residents are 
ex post mobile across regions. In the basic case, the intergovernmental transfers is 
designed to equalize the residents’ utilities ex post. With the residential mobility at 
t=2, however, their utilities will be equalized even in the absence of transfers. As 
addressed in the literature on fiscal federalism, transfers may rather be used to 
enhance efficiency of population allocation. It then seems that the ex post transfers 
give different consequences than the case without mobility.  
 
6.1 Setting  
 
Resident’s budget and utility 
 
For technical convenience, we assume that the second period public service takes a 
quasi linear form so that:  
       ))(/)(())((),( 22 iiiiiiiiiii GnBGsyvGcvGcv Ψ+−+−+=Ψ+≡ σ ,       (24) 
where iB is assumed to be the total amount of the bond issued in the first period 
and is redeemed in the second period. 3 
This specification assures that the saving decision in the first period does not rely 
on where to reside ex post.  
 
 
                                                  
3 In this section, we consider the mobility of residents, so ib used in sections above 
changes after residents move ex post.  
18
 6.2 Ex Post Behavior of the Central and Local Governments  
 
Free Mobility and stability 
 
Consider the individual who initially resides in region i, but may move to other regions 
in the second period. The mobility equilibrium implies that his utilities must be 
equalized between any of two regions, which corresponds to  
   
)(/)(/)(/)(/ kkkkkikkjjjjjijj GnBGsnFGnBGsnF Ψ+−+−+=Ψ+−+−+ σσ (25) 
for any k and j. In the present setting, is  does not influence the individual’s location 
decision because the individual carry his saving with him when moving to other regions. 
As addressed below, with the prefect mobility, this in turn implies that the first period 
saving is the same among residents born in the same region irrespective of their second 
period locations.  Define )(/)(/),( iiiiii
g
iiii GnBGnInF Ψ+−+−≡ σφ .Then iφ  is 
equalized across regions. So we can let iφ =φ for all i: 
  )(/)(/),( iiiiii
g
iii GnBGnInF Ψ+−+−= σφ             (26) 
Solving (25) for in  gives the regional population function: ),,,( φσ iigiiii BIGnn −=  
with 
          
i
i
i
i D
Gn
G −
−Ψ=∂
∂ 1)('                        (27.1)  
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The stability of the mobility equilibrium implies iD <0. In the following the above 
inequality is always assumed. φ  is determined by: 
          NBIGnJ
i ii
g
iii =−∑ =1 ),,,( φσ             (29) 
 
Local Government Ex post Behavior 
 
In the second period, one region contains heterogeneous residents in terms of the first 
period savings. The utility of the person born in region j at t=1 and residing in i at t=2 is 
given by )()( jji svsv +=+ φφ . His second period utility does not rely on where he 
resides. Then the regional optimization problem can be reduced to maximizeφ , given 
that ),( i
g
ii nIF  and ib  are decided ex ante and iσ  is transferred.  Making use of 
(27.1) and (29), we can establish 
        0
/1
/)1)('(
/
/ =−Ψ=∂∂
∂∂−= ∑∑ j j
ii
j j
ii
i D
DG
n
Gn
dG
d
φφ          (30)  
In the optimum, the first order condition becomes: 
1*)(' =Ψ G            (30’) 
 
Central Government Ex post Behavior 
 
As the regional optimization, the maximization of ex post welfare then becomes 
equivalent to maximizing φ . Note that the ex post welfare is given by )( ii i svn +∑ φ  
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 where in  denote the first period population of region i.  As the welfare weights, we 
use in  instead of in  given that the second period utility of resident originated from 
region i becomes )( isv +φ  no matter where he migrates ex post. Making use of (27.2) 
and (29), we have:  
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σφσ  (31) 
Given the central budget constraint (5), the above derivative must be equalized across 
regions in the ex post optimum. By (26) and (30’) or *GGi =  for all i, the first order 
condition reduces to:  
j
g
jjj
i
g
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n
InF
n
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∂
∂=∂
∂ ),(),(  ,                        (32) 
which assures the efficient allocation of the population given giI . Such allocation can be 
achieved by the use of the ex post transfer formula expressed as:    
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In the present context, the ex post transfers are used to assure efficiency of population 
allocation, whereas the basis model without mobility addresses ex post equity 
equalizing the private and public consumption. This difference has critical implications 
on the ex ante decisions of the local governments.  
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 6.3 Ex Ante Behavior of residents and the Local Government  
 
Resident’s saving optimization 
 
In the first period, the representative resident decides the level of saving to maximize 
his utility: 
)(),( 1 iiiiis svgstzuMAXi
++−− φ  
The first order condition is given by: 
*)()*,( 1 iciiiic svgstzu +=−− φ                      (17’) 
It is immediate that the saving relies solely on the first period residence.  
 
Local Government’s optimization 
 
The local governments choose ),( 1 gii It  to maximize the local utility in region i , that is: 
)*()/)(,( *1*1
,1
ii
g
iiiiiii
It
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g
ii
++−+−−= φ , 
where in  is the population given in the first period.  
Noting that 0* =
i
i
ds
dV , the first order conditions become: 
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dV +−== 10                                        (20’) 
 Making use of  (17’) and (20’), equation (19’) becomes  
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In contrast with the basic case, the investment is underprovided. The intuition is the 
following. In the absence of the mobility, the ex post transfers serve to equalize both the 
savings and the regional outputs across regions. Ex ante, this motivates the local 
government to raise local tax to finance giI  (as well as ig ) that lowers the resident’s 
saving, which in turn decreases the ex post equally shared resource Z . As such the 
local government can shift the burden of giI . In the present case, however, the ex post 
transfers do not equalize the savings, which close the avenue for the local government to 
share the investment cost, whereas the return on giI  remains equalized. As 
consequence, the ex ante incentive of the investment is discouraged.    
 
Consider the local borrowing, we have 
0)1(11 >−=−=
N
n
n
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c
c
i
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ii
i            (36) 
The local government always prefers to issue the bond. The reason is straightforward. 
The ex ante borrowing to finance ig  benefits the native residents at t=1, whereas the 
repayment cost is nationwide shared. Note that the local borrowing in the present case 
does not increase the resident’s saving, so the Ricardian Equivalence as stated in 
Proposition 2 does not apply.  
Now the results above can be summarized as the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 4 
Suppose that residents are freely mobile across regions. Then in the subgame perfect 
23
 (time consistent) equilibrium, we have: 
(a) **~ gigi II < . 
(b) giI
~  takes a smaller value for the smaller region, namely, gg II 21
~~ <  if 21 nn < . 
(c) Maximizing the level of the local borrowing, *ib  becomes optimal, which means 
that the regulation of local bonds is effective. 
 
Proposition 4 is sharply in contrast with Proposition 3, the case without mobility. As 
addressed above, on one hand, the local investment becomes lower compared with the 
socially optimal level. On the other hand, the central regulation becomes effective since 
the local governments would issue bonds without limit otherwise.  
 
Optimal Bond regulation 
 
So what is the ex ante optimal level of the local borrowing? In the case that the central 
government regulates the borrowing, it will select iB  so as to maximize: 
[ ]∑∑ ++−+−−= i iigiiiiiiii ii svnIBtstzunVn )*()/)~(~,~( *1*1 φ      (37) 
where tilde denotes the local government’s ex ante decisions. Incorporating (33), the 
optimization with respect to iB  yields:  
     0)( ** =−=+−= ∑∑∑ jcj jicjcj jigj jj
i
u
N
n
usv
N
n
uVn
dB
d φ       (38) 
In the last inequality, we use (17’) and (20’). The above holds for all regions, which gives 
)~,~()~,~( 1111 jjciic gcugcu = for all i and j. Alongside with (17’) and (20’), we can establish the 
following proposition.  
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Proposition 5 
Suppose that ex ante the central government can optimize the local bond regulation. 
Then we have (i) 11 ~~ cci = , (ii) 11 ~~ ggi =  and (iii) ssi ~* =  for all i.  
 
The proposition shows that the ex ante regulation equalize the private consumption in 
both periods as well as the first period public service. This does not mean however that 
the first best can be restored since the regional investments remain too little.  
 
SUMMARIZE 
 
Finally we can summarize the levels of variables in the equilibrium as follows.  
 
Table 
 
 *g
iI  
*
ig  iB  
No-mobility Optimal Over-provision redundant 
Free-mobility Under-provision Optimal Over-borrowing 
without regulations 
Optimal  
with regulations 
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper, by using a simple dynamic decentralized leadership model with local 
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 borrowing and regional productivity enhancing investment, analyzes inefficiency of 
resource allocation induced by the ex post transfers and examine the effect of local 
borrowing regulation. We extend the model to allow the mobility of residents, in which 
the central regulation turns to be effective. The ex post transfer (Soft budget) is 
designed for achieving optimal allocation of population rather than assuring ex post 
equity.  
The results obtained in this paper have addressed the following two points. First, 
consideration should be placed on dynamic strategic interaction between the local 
government and consumers through saving. Second, effects of the central regulation on 
local borrowing replies on whether or not residents are ex post mobile.  
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 Appendix 1: Effects on saving 
 
From Equation (17), we have the following results of comparative statics. 
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Appendix 2: Proof of Proposition 2 
 
From Equation (19) and (20) , we have  
⎟⎟
⎟⎟
⎠
⎞
⎜⎜
⎜⎜
⎝
⎛
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−
−
−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=
⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ +−−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛ −∂
∂=
−−+−+−+−∂
∂=
+=
dZ
dv
dZ
dv
N
nu
N
n
v
N
nnIF
n
db
ds
dI
dsnv
N
nvnIF
nN
n
db
dsu
N
nvuu
dI
dsnu
N
nvuvnIF
nN
n
dt
dV
dI
dVn
c
cii
cc
i
c
i
i
g
i
i
i
i
g
i
i
ic
i
ci
g
i
i
i
i
ii
c
i
c
i
c
i
gg
i
i
i
i
c
i
c
i
gci
g
ii
i
i
i
i
g
i
i
i
1
11),(
**)1(1),(
)1)(()(),(
0
**
1
  (A.6) 
 
Since 0
1
1 >
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛ +−
−
−
dZ
dv
dZ
dv
N
nu
N
n
c
cii
cc
i
, we have        
1),( ** =∂
∂
i
g
ig
i
nIF
I
.                                               (A.6’)    
Since Equation (21) is the function of ig ,
g
iI  and iQ , we have  
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The equilibrium ( giii IQg ˆ,ˆ,ˆ ) can be characterized from Equations (A.6’)-(A.7) and 
(A.9). T herefore we can confirm that iii bsQ −= *ˆ and giiii Ibtg ˆˆ 1 −+= are independent 
from the regulation level cib , now we have 1
1
−=
i
i
db
dt  and 1* =
i
i
db
ds . Also from 
i
g
iiii QIgzc −−−=1 , 1ˆic  becomes independent from cib  
 
Appendix 3 : Example 
In this appendix, we provide an example to compare the subgame-perfect solution with 
the first-best solution. We specify the utility function as follows. 
)log()log()log()log(),,,( 2121 iiiiiiii GcgcGgccU +++=  (A.2.1) 
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Now we have  
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From the ex post behavior of the central government and the local government in Stage 
2, Equations (9) and (10) imply: 
Gc =2  
Therefore, Equation (11) yields: 
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Now we have 
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From Resident’s saving optimization, Equation (17) implies: 
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Then Equation (2) becomes 
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Combining (A.2.5) with (A.2.6), we have the equilibrium levels as follows. 
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With Equation (3), we have  
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Using Equation (17), Equation (20) becomes  
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 Inserting (A.2.7) into (A.2.8), we have 
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Inserting (A.2.9) into (A.2.7), we have  
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In addition, we have: 
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